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When Litigation is Not the Only Way: Consensus 
Building and Mediation As Public Interest Lawyering 
Carrie Menkel-Meadow* 
“The skillful management of conflicts [is] among the highest 
of human skills.” 
–Stuart Hampshire1 
I. INTRODUCTION: PROCESS IS JUSTICE 
British social philosopher Stuart Hampshire recently articulated 
the fundamental and foundational principles of the modern conflict 
resolution movement (and I do call it a movement).2 He asserted that, 
“there will always be a plurality of different and incompatible 
conceptions of the good and there cannot be a single comprehensive 
and consistent theory of human virtue.”3 Correspondingly, “our 
political enmities in the city or state will never come to an end while 
we have diverse life stories and diverse imaginations.”4 Hampshire, a 
socially progressive, socialist philosopher hoped to articulate 
 
 * Professor of Law and Director, Hewlett-Georgetown Program in Conflict Resolution 
and Problem Solving, Georgetown University Law Center. This Article was prepared as part of 
Washington University School of Law’s 2001-2002 Public Interest Law Speaker Series. Thanks 
to Karen Tokarz, my friend and host and to all of my good colleagues on the Washington 
University law faculty. And, thanks and appreciation to my research assistant, Joshua Eizen, my 
friend and literary guide, Marshall Sikowitz, and to the Harvard Program on Negotiation (PON) 
faculty workshop (and especially Sara Cobb, PON’s then Executive Director) where I first 
presented some of my thoughts on how falling balloons and human motivation could not be 
saved or cabined by purely rational or law-based “solutions.”  
 1. STUART HAMPSHIRE, JUSTICE IS CONFLICT 35 (2000). 
 2. Id. Hampshire first articulated these ideas at Harvard University’s Tanner Lectures on 
Human Values in two lectures during the 1996-1997 academic year. Hampshire expanded the 
Lectures in Justice is Conflict. Id. at xiii. Harvard University, 1996-1997, published as Justice is 
Conflict (2000). 
 3. Id. at 34. 
 4. Id. at 5. 
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universal conceptions of the good.5 In his lifetime of reflection on 
this important subject, Hampshire concluded that at best we know the 
bad things–the evils we want to eliminate–when we see them, but we 
cannot agree on either the means to eliminate those evils or the 
content of the good we seek to promote.6 One person’s equitable re-
distribution of wealth is another’s person confiscation of justly held 
and earned property. In the evening of his productive years of 
contemplation, Hampshire adopted a procedural or process-driven 
social philosophy that I want to discuss today. Hampshire has named 
and described the moral articulation of the approach I have been 
arguing for, teaching and practicing with for much of my career in 
seeking social justice through law. Today we will explore how 
processes other than litigation can serve the public interest, at least as 
well, if not better than, the more commonly used methods of lawsuits, 
litigation and commanded rule-changes. 
While Hampshire concludes that agreement on the substantive 
good is not possible in our modern, diverse, and pluralistic world,7 he 
is optimistic that there might be one human universal: “fairness in 
procedure is an invariable value, a constant in human nature . . . . 
[T]here is everywhere a well-recognized need for procedures for 
conflict resolution, which can replace brute force and domination and 
tyranny.”8 Hampshire refers to several forms of conflict resolution, 
including both well-known forms such as adjudication, arbitration, 
and “judging,”9 as well as broader political processes such as 
deliberating, examining, discussing policy choices, diplomatic 
negotiations, and “hearing.”10  
Seeking to define a universal human propensity for procedural 
fairness, Hampshire reduces conflict resolution to the single 
principle, audi alteram partem (“hear the other side”),11 a universal 
principle of “the adversary argument” in which thinking is identified 
 
 5. Hampshire lists absence of violence, oppression, illness, and poverty, among other 
things in his universal conceptions of the good. See HAMPSHIRE, supra note 1. 
 6. See id. 
 7. Id. 
 8. Id. at 4-5. 
 9. Id. at 7. 
 10. Id. at 9-10. 
 11. Id. at 8. 
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with the use of reason to weigh alternatives.12 When properly 
expanded from “hear the other side” to “hear all sides,” Hampshire 
provides a foundational principle from which to measure whether 
justice and the public interest are served in all political and legal 
decision making. Where Hampshire sees justice in the recognition 
that all conflict is inevitable and must be humanely tended to, those 
in the conflict resolution movement see the conflict resolution 
processes employed as at least one important measure of justice. 
Furthermore, despite what law professors teach in civil procedure or 
constitutional law, “due” or “just” process does not necessarily 
require litigation, a “day in court,” or a lawsuit. 
Today, using a variety of illustrations from real issues, real cases, 
scholarship, literature, films, and other cultural artifacts, I want to 
explore how processes that enable the expression and “handling” of 
conflict may serve the public interest as well as, if not better than, the 
simplistic Anglo-American conception of adversary justice or public 
interest litigation. 
II. PROBLEMS WITH “TWO-SIDED” ADVERSARIALISM 
It is common in human thinking to divide the world into 
dichotomous categories. In my view, there is truth in the old joke, 
“There are two kinds of people in the world—those who divide 
things into two—and those who don’t.” Hampshire thinks of human 
conflicts as having two sides, perhaps because he is a product of 
Anglo-philosophical thinking, the same system that produced the 
adversary legal system. Hampshire is not alone in conceiving of 
human dilemmas as the confrontation of good and evil, the just and 
unjust, competition and cooperation, the rich and the poor, plaintiffs 
and defendants, as if there were null sets in all those places in 
between those categories. In a binary view of process, we need to 
listen to, take in, and fully understand the “other side” and then either 
we will be persuaded through negotiation or a third party will decide 
by adjudication how those opposite views should be reconciled, 
accommodated, or judged. 
 
 12. Id. at 8-9. 
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I am one of those people who does not divide the world into two 
categories,13 so I want to expand on Hampshire’s significant 
observations about the importance of conflict resolution as a process 
to demonstrate that his principle of “hearing all sides” supplies the 
philosophical justification for a variety of new forms of legal and 
political dispute resolution, even about hotly contested, “adversarial” 
issues affecting the public interest. 
Few modern legal problems have only two sides. Civil rights 
issues implicate employees, employers, customers, private entities, 
many layers of governmental enforcement agencies, and grievance 
processes. Environmental issues involve developers, local 
communities, who themselves may be split between pro-development 
employment seekers and environmental conservationists, a wide 
variety of disagreeing public interest groups14 and federal, state, and 
local agencies. Mass torts involve literally hundreds and thousands of 
parties, not only the plaintiffs injured by mass accidents, products 
defects, or slow environmental harms, but also multiple layers of 
manufacturers, distributors, and insurers. Consider how often in 
litigation the “real parties in interest” include others besides those 
formally named as plaintiff or defendant in any given case.15 To the 
extent that multiple parties have claims, needs, interests and “rights” 
in a legal action, the concept of “hearing both sides” may be falsely 
reductionist in assuming that all parties can align themselves on one 
or the other side of the “v.” and that any resolution favoring one side 
over the other will solve the problem, conclude the litigation, or end 
the conflict. Consider how many years the legal issues in Brown v. 
Board of Education,16 have been relitigated, not to mention the larger 
 
 13. See, e.g., Carrie Menkel-Meadow, The Trouble with the Adversary System in a Post-
Modern, Multi-cultural World, 38 WM. & MARY L. REV. 5 (1996). 
 14. Consider the different goals of various public interest environmental groups, such as, 
the Sierra Club, the Humane Society, the Nature Conservancy, the Audubon Society, and the 
World Wildlife Federation. Some of the groups agree to land trades for development, others 
resist all development, and still others “take sides” when one type of animal preservation 
threatens another. 
 15. For examples of ways to read a case from a broader conflict resolution perspective, 
see Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Taking Problem-Solving Pedagogy Seriously, 49 J. LEG. ED. 14 
(1999). 
 16. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
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social dilemmas that continue to plague education in our nation.17 
These dilemmas include economics, quality, privatization, and “white 
flight.”  
Inspired by both practical achievement18 and modern political 
theory,19 new forms of legal processes have developed out of the 
failures of conventional litigation and are now used in both private 
settings and public settings such as courts, administrative regulatory 
processes, and even in legislative contexts. Utilizing the Hampshirean 
and Habermasian20 principles of “hearing the other side”21 and 
engaging in “democratic discourse,”22 lawyers are increasingly 
involved in negotiation, mediation, and consensus building situations 
that depend on conflict resolution processes that are different from 
argumentation, competitive advocacy, and law or rule-based decision 
making. These different forms of conflict resolution employ different 
techniques, require different skills, and are based on different 
“moralities” or internally justified structures and outcomes.  
In law, Lon Fuller is the legal philosopher who has most 
eloquently written about the differentiation of legal processes for 
different purposes.23 Indeed, as part of the “legal process” school of 
jurisprudence, Fuller wrote a series of articles suggesting that 
adjudication, mediation, and arbitration each had their own 
structures, procedures, and independent “moralities.”24 Fuller 
 
 17. Privatization and “white flight,” as well as economic and quality issues continue to 
plague education. 
 18. See, e.g., THE CONSENSUS BUILDING HANDBOOK pt. 3 (Lawrence Susskind et al. eds., 
1999) (review the case studies reported). 
 19. See, e.g., JOHN S. DRYZEK, DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY AND BEYOND (2000); 
DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY (1997); JAMES BOHMAN, PUBLIC DELIBERATION (1996); MARK 
KINGWELL, A CIVIL TONGUE (1995); DELIBERATIVE POLITICS (Stephen Macedo ed., 1999); 
AMY GUTTMANN & DENIS THOMPSON, DEMOCRACY AND DISAGREEMENT (1996); 
DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY (Jon Elster ed., 1998); MICHAEL C. DORF & CHARLES F. SABEL, A 
Constitution of Democratic Experimentalism, 98 COL. L. REV. 267 (1998). 
 20. JURGEN HABERMAS, BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS: CONTRIBUTIONS TO A DISCOURSE 
THEORY OF LAW AND DEMOCRACY (William Rehg trans., 1996). 
 21. HAMPSHIRE, supra note 1, at 8. 
 22. See sources cited supra note 19. 
 23. Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Mothers and Fathers of Invention: The Intellectual Founders 
of ADR, 16 OHIO ST. J. DISP. RES. 1 (2000). 
 24. See LON L. FULLER, THE PRINCIPLES OF SOCIAL ORDER (Kenneth I. Winston, ed. 
1981); Lon L. Fuller, The Forms and Limits of Adjudication, 92 HARV. L. REV. 353 (1978); 
Lon Fuller, Mediation—Its Form and Functions, 44 S. CAL. L. REV. 305 (1971); Lon L. Fuller, 
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believed that each process was uniquely suited to resolving or dealing 
with particular kinds of legal problems and that different processes 
should be used for fact, law, norm, or relationship issues. For Fuller, 
as for me, one “size” of dispute resolution process—adjudication–
does not fit all. Indeed, modern theorists and practitioners of dispute 
resolution have increasingly permitted, and even encouraged, some 
hybridization of these various processes to permit a greater variety of 
“hearing and listening,”25 as well as decisional processes depending 
on such factors as the kinds of issues implicated and the number of 
parties involved.26 
III. THE STRUCTURE OF PROCESS PLURALISM: DIFFERENT MODES 
FOR DIFFERENT CLAIMS 
Conflict resolution processes as tools for achieving social justice 
have several separate elements. First, different processes by 
definition develop their own process norms, justified by different 
conceptions of what that process is supposed to do. Adjudication, 
with which those in the public interest law movement are most 
familiar, involves adversary advocacy of competing parties and 
principles, often beginning with a contested trial and then proceeding 
to appellate resolution and decision.27 In contrast, mediation and 
negotiation use less formal means of party engagement, where it is 
contemplated that unfettered dialogue, followed by consent and 
agreement will produce an outcome that both, or all, parties have 
participated in crafting. 
Second, different processes produce different kinds of outcomes. 
Proponents, like myself, of problem-solving through negotiation, 
mediation, or the newer forms of consensus building, believe that the 
outcomes produced by such participatory processes are qualitatively 
 
Collective Bargaining and the Arbitrator, 15 NAT’L. ACAD. ARB. PROC. 8 (1962); Lon L. 
Fuller, An Afterword: Science and the Judicial Process, 79 HARV. L. REV. 1604 (1966). 
 25. See supra note 10 and accompanying text. 
 26. See, e.g., Frank E.A. Sander & Stephen B. Goldberg, Fitting the Forum to the Fuss: A 
User Friendly Guide to Selecting an ADR Procedure, 10 NEG. J. 49 (1994). 
 27. Trials are often contested when there are competing views of the “facts.” Litigation 
often advances to the appellate level when one of the parties seeks a definitive legal rule 
change. Consider the prototypical public interest law campaigns for Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 
U.S. 483 (1954) and Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
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better than those produced by third party decision-makers. Consensus 
outcomes are more likely to focus on the future, as well as the past. 
They are supposed to be based on underlying interests and needs, 
rather than arguments and positions. As the popular parlance goes, 
they are intended to “expand the pie,” or look for additional resources 
or new ideas, rather than to divide a presumed limited sum of 
resources available to the parties. In more technical terms, different 
processes are more likely to produce “pareto optimal” solutions28 
than the assumed compromises of negotiation or “split the baby” 
compromise verdicts or arbitration awards. In processes where all the 
“real parties in interest”29 participate, there will be more than two 
sides to each issue and very likely there will be more than one issue 
to be resolved. Expanding, rather than narrowing, issues will increase 
the likelihood of reaching good agreements, because as game theory 
and other quantitative theories propose, more solutions are possible 
when more “trades” are possible.30 Although it may seem counter-
intuitive to conventional legal reasoners, the more disagreement 
about what is important, the better. Oppositional or complementary 
“trades” allow each side to satisfy their most important needs by 
meeting the most important needs of other parties. With more 
complementary, rather than conflicting, desires, we can find more 
ways to share things, an elaboration of the Homans theory of 
complementary needs.31  
For all of the above reasons, the current theoretical and practical 
technology of ADR approaches to legal problems would be better 
described as “appropriate” dispute resolution, rather than 
“alternative” dispute resolution, as we refer to it now. Matching 
different techniques with different goals can help to assess what 
process is most appropriate for accomplishing the outcome that is 
best suited to the particular kind of problem.32  
 
 28. “Paretu optimal” solutions are those that make each party as well off as it can be 
without unnecessary harm to the other parties. See HOWARD RAIFFA, THE ART AND SCIENCE OF 
NEGOTIATION 139 (1982). 
 29. See supra note 15 and accompanying text. 
 30. See, e.g., HOWARD RAIFFA, THE ART AND SCIENCE OF NEGOTIATION (1982). 
 31. See generally GEORGE C. HOMANS, SOCIAL BEHAVIOR: ITS ELEMENTARY FORMS 
(Robert K. Merton ed., 1974). 
 32. As examples, consider, joint custody, rather than exclusive physical custody in 
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In addition to the selection of different procedural rules33 and 
different rules of decision34 entirely different and morally 
differentiated modes of appeal, argument, and justification may be 
utilized to deal with different kinds of conflicts. Lawyers and rational 
analysts clearly prefer arguments, principles, rights, and rules. 
Economists, political scientists, some lawyers, and realists recognize 
that preference trading or bargaining is the actual way in which 
political and legal decisions are made and utilities are maximized. 
More recently, a newer group of theorists, drawn from a wide variety 
of disciplines35 have argued that emotions, feelings, passions, and 
belief systems are an integral part of the way people process 
information, argue for justice, and decide whether to agree to 
something or resolve a conflict.36 Most scholars focus on the tensions 
between the first two of these “modes”—the tension between rational 
principle and “crude bargaining.”37 More recently, focus in conflict 
resolution has turned to the role of feelings, beliefs, the need for 
cathartic narrative, and human “imagination” or “soul”38 to determine 
whether conflicts are deemed, by the parties, to be “resolved.” 
Thus, conflict over legal, moral, social, and political principles 
and “goods”39 can be handled and “manipulated” in a number of 
different ways. The “essentialist” public interest lawyer tends to think 
 
parenting. See I Am Sam (New Line Productions, 2001); Carrie Menkel-Meadow, I Am Sam as 
an ADR Movie, Picturing Justice, at http://www.picturingjustice.com/iamsam_meadow.htm 
(last visited Apr. 23, 2002). Also consider environmental trades of land for animal and habitat 
preservation and waste siting, contingent agreements for science disputes and medical 
monitoring for some product defects cases and mass torts and even simple annuities for 
traditional tort cases. 
 33. Compare HENRY M. ROBERT, ROBERT’S RULES OF ORDER (Darwin Patnode ed., 
1989), and the FED. R. CIV. P. with THE CONSENSUS BUILDING HANDBOOK, supra note 18, at 
pt. 1. 
 34. Different rules of decision include one or more judges, majority, plurality, or “super 
majority” vote, and unanimous consent. 
 35. Proponents span the range from philosophy and political science, to sociology, 
anthropology, critical legal approaches based on race and gender and post-modernism. 
 36. JON ELSTER, SOLOMONIC JUDGMENTS (1989); JON ELSTER, ALCHEMIES OF THE MIND 
(1999). 
 37. See, e.g., Jon Elster, Strategic Uses of Argument, in BARRIERS TO CONFLICT 
RESOLUTION (Kenneth Arrow et. al. eds., 1995); Cass R. Sunstein, Agreement without Theory, 
in DELIBERATIVE POLITICS, supra note 19. 
 38. These are Hampshire’s phrases. See HAMPSHIRE, supra note 1. 
 39. “Goods” is used here in both the material and ideal senses of the word. 
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of litigation and adjudication as the normative ways of accomplishing 
public good, perhaps because the model set by Brown v. Board of 
Education appeared so successful.40 At least some sophisticated 
lawyers, who care about public interest and seek social justice, 
recognize that litigation, although it has its uses, may not be optimal 
for all forms of legal change. Many public interest groups use, and 
have recently intensified their use of, legislative and lobbying efforts. 
Many groups in the civil rights, civil liberties and environmental 
movements use, or had to defend against, the referendum process. In 
the administrative context, some public interest groups participate in 
negotiated rule-making,41 one of the hybrid forms of dispute 
resolution I want to highlight here. Poverty lawyers and community 
development activists always explore other models of social and legal 
change, from organizing, to street or court theater, to community 
education, to collaborative joint venture strategies.42 More recently, 
even the most avid of traditional poverty law advocates recognize the 
importance of “facilitating coalitions” and encouraging “collaborative 
relationships across professions.”43 
 
 40. Of course, in recent years many question and debate the “success” of that landmark 
piece of litigation and strategy. The debate occurs not only among legal scholars, see Herbert 
Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1959), but 
among political scientists and economists who are attempting to assess the actual empirical 
impact of legal efforts to desegregate the schools, see, e.g., GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE 
HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING ABOUT SOCIAL CHANGE? (1991); JAMES HECKMAN & 
PETRA TODD, SOURCES OF AFRICAN-AMERICAN ECONOMIC PROGRESS IN THE LABOR MARKET 
IN THE 20TH CENTURY. 
 41. See, e.g., Jody Freeman, Collaborative Governance in the Administrative State, 45 
UCLA L. REV. 1 (1997). 
 42. See, e.g., SAUL ALINSKY, REVEILLE FOR RADICALS (1969); Stephen Wexler, 
Practicing Law for Poor People, 79 YALE L.J. 1049 (1970); Peter Gabel & Paul Harris, 
Building Power and Breaking Images: Critical Legal Theory and the Practice of Law, 11 NYU 
REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 369 (1982-1983); Lucie E. White, Collaborative Lawyering in the 
Field? On Mapping the Paths from Rhetoric to Practice, 1 CLINICAL L. REV. 157 (1994); 
Michael Diamond, Community Lawyering: Revisiting the Old Neighborhood, 32 COLUM. HUM. 
RTS. L. REV. 67 (2000); Ingrid V. Eagly, Community Education: Creating a New Vision of 
Legal Services Practice, 4 CLINICAL L. REV. 433 (1998); Symposium, Lawyering for Poor 
Communities in the Twenty-First Century, 25 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 673 (1998). 
 43. See, e.g., Louise G. Trubek, REINVIGORATING POVERTY LAW PRACTICE, 25 
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 801 (1998); Jennifer Gordon, We Make the Road by Walking: Immigrant 
Workers, The Workplace Project and the Struggle for Social Change, 30 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. 
REV. 407 (1995). 
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IV. MUST WE COMPETE TO “WIN” SOCIAL JUSTICE OR CAN WE 
“COOPERATE”? 
The underlying tension of how best to achieve legal and social 
change on behalf of “the public interest”44 replicates basic 
philosophical, epistemological, political, and behavioral issues about 
whether it is humans’ lot to have to compete over social goods45 or 
whether collaboration, community, cooperation, and shared fates 
motivates people to work together to achieve a better world. Let me 
illustrate how this basic human dilemma runs through all human 
activity, from the basic instinct for survival to more complex efforts 
to use law to effectuate social change. 
In a brilliant novel, entitled Enduring Love, Ian McEwen 
eloquently demonstrates this tension. In the opening sequence of the 
novel, the protagonist, a science writer, is about to share a much 
wanted picnic with his wife, only to discover that a large air balloon 
carrying a child and an older man are hovering above in the sky, in 
obvious distress. Not knowing what propels him except a child’s cry, 
Joe rushes to grab a dangling rope and steady the balloon, joined by 
four other men, from different points around a field, “racing into this 
story and its labyrinths.”46 All five men have different ideas about 
how to save the boy and his adult companion, as the wind gusts build 
and the dangling rope, man and child are pushed above a steep 
escarpment. Four of the men eventually let go and the balloon, the 
man and boy, and one man still dangling from the rope, sail over the 
cliff. The protagonist suggests that some calculations of the speed of 
wind gusts, weights of the five men, distance and height might have 
saved the boy and man had anyone been able to do the calculations in 
enough time, the failure of “rational” thinking in emergencies. In the 
aftermath of what turns into a catastrophe, the loss of life, Joe Rose 
 
 44. I am avoiding definitions here. For my efforts to define what constitutes a social 
justice lawyer engaged in “cause lawyering”, see Carrie Menkel-Meadow, The Causes of Cause 
Lawyering: Toward An Understanding of the Motivation and Commitment of Social Justice 
Lawyers, in CAUSE LAWYERING: POLITICAL COMMITMENTS AND PROFESSIONAL 
RESPONSIBILITIES (Austin Sarat et al. eds., 1998). 
 45. Competition recharacterized by the “zero-sum”/scarcity view of human nature, 
requiring litigation, and command and control for social justice and re-distribution. 
 46. IAN MCEWAN, ENDURING LOVE 1 (1997). 
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sees the problem as akin to the Prisoner’s Dilemma. Each of the five 
men had to decide whether to hold on to the rope and steady the 
balloon as a strong gust takes it up over the falling escarpment. In 
that split second moment, all the teachings of human nature as 
competitive and self-preserving or cooperative and group protective 
are brought to bear in the situation. As with the classic Prisoner’s 
Dilemma, the parties cannot communicate with each other because 
the wind is so strong they cannot hear each other shouting 
contradictory advice and intentions. Joe recounts, from his memory 
of the event, the simultaneous desire to “stay on the rope and save the 
boy, [when] barely a neuronal pulse later, came other thoughts, in 
which fear and instant calculations of logarithmic complexity were 
fused.”47 None of the five men admits to being the first to let go, 
though all but one of the men do let go, as the balloon sails off the 
cliff. Joe attributes their failure to coordinate their actions and do the 
greatest good–the saving of all, to the lack of a leader, team, and 
plan, rather than just themselves. In that instant he recognizes that 
“cooperation –the basis of our earliest hunting successes, the force 
behind our evolving capacities for language, the glue of our social 
cohesion” failed them because:  
letting go was in our nature too. Selfishness is also written on 
our hearts. This is our mammalian conflict; what to give to 
others and what to keep for yourself. Treading that line, 
keeping the others in check and being kept in check by them, is 
what we call morality . . . our crew enacted morality’s ancient, 
irresolvable dilemma: us, or me.48 
As each man accedes to the salience of “me,” the “us” is lost and 
death ensues. For Joe Rose, a “society” that began as a good society 
becomes a bad society as it disintegrates as each man looks out for 
himself alone and one dies, dangling from the rope, as his single 
weight is insufficient to bring the balloon to safe ground. 
In that literarily realized moment, McEwen describes the plight of 
us all as humans and certainly of the public interest-seeking lawyer—
how should I act to save or better human life? Do I hold on to my 
 
 47. Id. at 14. 
 48. Id. at 14-17. 
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self-interest and self-preservation and compete with others, or stay 
and attempt to coordinate action with others to achieve the greatest 
good for the greatest number? This dilemma of cooperate or defect is 
played out daily in both the macro and micro decisions of our lives. 
McEwen’s story dramatizes the need for human coordination of 
action, the failure of rational calculations and incomplete 
information, and the conflicting impulses and emotions of those who 
would seek to do good. 
The recent movie, A Beautiful Mind,49 is a clever Hollywood 
depiction of the more complicated ideas of John Nash’s bargaining 
theories, within the context of non-cooperative and cooperative 
“games”50 within game theory. In game theory, to cooperate is to be 
able to share information, non-cooperative games are those in which, 
like the Prisoner’s Dilemma, the parties cannot communicate 
preferences, interests, threats, or other forms of information.51 In the 
movie, John Nash’s more complicated explanations of equilibrium 
points in multi-party non-cooperative games is demonstrated as a 
problem of maximizing joint gain when all the men in a bar compete 
for the single beautiful blond. With all attempting to maximize 
individual gain with a scarce resource, a single blond, there will be 
one victor and a lot of lonely men and female brunettes. Nash sees, in 
a moment of creative insight,52 that all the men would be better off if 
they paired up with their “second choices” and all got dates. This 
demonstrates, Hollywood style, that an equilibrium point of 
 
 49. A BEAUTIFUL MIND (Universal Pictures 2001). 
 50. See, e.g., John Nash, The Bargaining Problem, 18 ECONOMETRICA 155 (1950); John 
Nash, Two-Person Cooperative Games, 21 ECONOMETRICA 129 (1953). 
 51. For technical descriptions of the Prisoner’s Dilemma, see, e.g., WILLIAM 
POUNDSTONE, PRISONER’S DILEMMA (1992); DOUGLAS G. BAIRD ET AL., GAME THEORY AND 
THE LAW (1994); AVINASH DIXIT & BARRY NALEBUFF, THINKING STRATEGICALLY: THE 
COMPETITIVE EDGE IN BUSINESS, POLITICS AND EVERYDAY LIFE (1991). For less technical 
depictions, just watch NYPD Blue (NBC television broadcast) on television every week where 
Prisoner’s Dilemma is literally shown as two compatriots in crime are locked up in different 
cells and forced or cajoled into “defecting” against each other, with promises of “better deals” 
for cooperating with the police. 
 52. The real story of mathematical genius is a bit more complex, as proofs have to be 
elaborated to the satisfaction of peers. See, e.g., MIHALY CSIKSZENTMIHALYI, CREATIVITY: 
FLOW AND THE PSYCHOLOGY OF DISCOVERY AND INVENTION (1996); SYLVIA NASAR, A 
BEAUTIFUL MIND: A BIOGRAPHY OF JOHN FORBES NASH, JR., WINNER OF THE NOBEL PRIZE IN 
ECONOMICS, 1994 (1998). 
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maximizing joint gain can be established for multi-party games or 
dilemmas, just as a “minimax” strategy, developed by original game 
theorists Von Neumann and Morgenstern,53 can establish a point of 
strategic agreement based on a combination of mistrust and self-
interest in zero-sum games.54 Game theory elucidates that 
combination of rational strategic thinking, the ability to share 
information, the formation of preferences, interests and utilities and 
most importantly, the “rules” or assumptions that determine whether 
outcomes will be “rational” or “maximizing,” either for particular 
individual players or for all of them “in the game.” 
This narrative which spawned decades of mathematical, political 
science,55 and psychological research into human motivation and 
decision-making comes from our own domain of law enforcement 
(the “prisoner’s dilemma”). The truth, however, is that its application 
to real legal disputes is actually much more complex. Information 
rules and the number of parties, as well as initial resource 
endowments,56 make the assumptions of game theory evocative for 
us, but not finally determinative or fully satisfying. Therefore, game 
theory asks the somewhat dichotomous question of whether to 
cooperate or defect, whether to hold on to the rope to save the other 
or let go and save our self. Unfortunately, legal, social, and political 
disputes are not so simple and often pose more multi-faceted 
questions. If the parties always defect, or hide information, they will 
not know about the possibilities of mutually agreeable solutions to 
their problems. If they seek to “win” a dramatic court suit, they may 
leave the other side with a strong desire for revenge that will inhibit 
compliance with even the most definitive court ruling. Further, if the 
conditions change, a ruling based on the past set of events or 
conditions may quickly be avoided or rendered moot.57 
 
 53. JOHN VON NEUMANN & OSKAR MORGENSTERN, THEORY OF GAMES AND ECONOMIC 
BEHAVIOR (1944). 
 54. POUNDSTONE, supra note 51, at 97. 
 55. ROBERT AXELROD, THE EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION (1984). 
 56. Classic game theory assumes “players” of equal bargaining power, see Nash, supra 
note 50. 
 57. Consider how a school district-based set of geographical rulings in the remedial 
sequella of Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954), made broader remedial options across 
districts much harder to justify, as more and more whites fled to the suburbs or private schools 
following Brown. See Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717 (1974) (Detroit school desegregation 
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Therefore, the question of whether to compete or cooperate is too 
complicated and important to leave to the dry assumptions of game 
theory, especially when people’s lives and social justice hang in the 
balance. For this reason, I suggest that conventional lawsuits and 
important, but limited, “competitive” and polarized public interest 
campaigns are not the best ways to achieve social justice in the 
current multi-partied and multi-issue world, especially with the 
unequal resource allocations of the parties. Social justice is not a 
“game.” If the goal is to maximize joint gain, or at least improve the 
social conditions for those worst off, then we will need all the tools 
and all the strategies that are likely to help. As McEwen’s balloon is 
buffeted by sudden winds beyond the parties’ control, team work, 
coordination, communication, and cooperation may be necessary to 
bring the people back to ground for a safe landing. Public interest 
lawyers, indeed, all lawyers, need to learn and then use a wider 
variety of techniques and processes to achieve their aims of social 
justice.  
V. LEGAL PRACTICE, PROBLEM SOLVING, AND SOCIAL JUSTICE: 
SOME EXAMPLES 
Though many do think of American legal and governmental 
processes in binary terms—fact and law, plaintiffs and defendants, 
Republicans and Democrats, federalism and states’ rights, developers 
and conservationists, conservatives and liberals—the truth is far more 
complex as modern legal and governmental developments have well 
illustrated. Even our two party system is contingent historically and 
might have turned out differently if Thomas Jefferson had acceded to 
the request of John Adams58 that they create a coalition government 
when the outcome of the 1796 election seemed in doubt and too close 
to call.59 Adams hoped that the parties could put aside their 
 
case). 
 58. Perhaps the compromise was suggested by Abigail Adams. If women were among the 
founding “mothers” would our governmental structure have looked different? MARY BETH 
NORTON, FOUNDING MOTHERS AND FATHERS: GENDERED POWER AND THE FORMING OF 
AMERICAN SOCIETY (1996); LYNNE WITHEY, DEAREST FRIEND: A LIFE OF ABIGAIL ADAMS 
(1981). 
 59. See JOSEPH J. ELLIS, FOUNDING BROTHERS: THE REVOLUTIONARY GENERATION 179-
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antagonism for the good of the new Republic, despite differences 
over foreign policy and the national debt, among other issues, 
including slavery. Jefferson, however, retreated to Monticello and our 
two party system arose in lurid60 and contested adversarialism. 
As modern inheritors of Adams’ desire to do what was best for the 
polity as a whole, but perhaps ironically using Jeffersonian-inspired 
principles of regionalism and local control, a number of 
“experiments” in governance and political decision-making focus on 
transcending binary oppositions as ways of achieving resolutions to 
legal and political conflicts.61 
At the level of political theory these experiments draw their life 
and justification from participatory democracy and democratic 
discourse.62 At the level of process, many of these processes draw 
their practice from mediation theory and practice.63 Mediation 
theories strive to reach a consensual agreement that maximizes joint, 
not individual gain, and depends, in part, on the facilitation of a third 
party neutral to manage information sharing, rules of process, and 
rules of decision and creative brainstorming processes to enrich the 
range of possibilities for resolution. 
Mediation and its cousin, consensus building for multi-party, 
multi-issue public policy decision-making, are undertaken for several 
different reasons including: functional problem-solving64; law 
 
88 (2000) [hereinafter ELLIS, FOUNDING BROTHERS] (suggesting that Adams sought to develop 
a bi-partisan government with Jefferson, which was opposed by James Madison, Jefferson’s 
political and partisan strategist). See also JOSEPH J. ELLIS, PASSIONATE SAGE: THE LEGACY OF 
JOHN ADAMS 29-32 (1993). 
 60. Both sides (Federalists and Republicans) engaged in personal slander as well as 
political diatribes, the famous James Callendar writing scurrilous stories about anyone when 
paid by the other side. See ELLIS, FOUNDING BROTHERS, supra note 59. 
 61. See, e.g., THE CONSENSUS BUILDING HANDBOOK, supra note 18, at pt. 3. 
 62. See supra note 15; LAWRENCE SUSSKIND & LIORA ZION, STRENGTHENING THE 
DEMOCRATIC PROCESS IN THE UNITED STATES (2001) (manuscript on file with the author). 
 63. See, e.g., CARRIE MENKEL-MEADOW, MEDIATION: THEORY POLICY AND PRACTICE 
(2001) [hereinafter MENKEL-MEADOW, MEDIATION]; Howard Raiffa, Post-Settlement 
Settlements, 1 NEG. J. 9 (1985); see also Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Toward Another View of 
Legal Negotiation: The Structure of Problem Solving, 31 UCLA L. REV. 754 (1984). 
 64. This includes resolving a dispute, environmental siting, clean-up allocations, block 
grant allocation and internal organizational dispute resolution. See, e.g., Lauren Edelman et al., 
Internal Dispute Resolution: The Transformation of Civil Rights in the Workplace, 27 LAW & 
SOC’Y REV. 497 (1993); The Many, Different, and Complex Roles Played by Omsbudsmen in 
Dispute Resolution, 16 NEG. J. 35 (Howard Gadlin ed., 2000). 
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making65; litigation settlement66; legal decision-making in new legal 
institutions67; policy development68; strategic planning and 
organizational change69; multi-jurisdictional disputes, treaties and 
law-making opportunities70; dialogues71; and healing, transformative, 
and expressive encounters.72  
The use of mediation or consensus building processes involve 
 
 65. This includes negotiated rule-making, local rules, development of state-wide 
commissions, international treaties and negotiated orders, such as the Kyoto Global Warming 
treaty, etc.). See, e.g., Philip Harter, Negotiating Regulations: A Cure for the Malaise, 71 GEO. 
L.J. 1 (1982). 
 66. Mediation is used to settle mass torts and class action lawsuits. 
 67. Problem-solving courts, such as family, drug courts, “vice,” and domestic violence 
courts often utilize mediation. See, e.g., Judith Kaye, Changing Courts in Changing Times, 48 
HASTINGS L.J. 851 (1997); Michael Dorf & Charles Sabel, Drug Treatment Courts and 
Emergent Experimentalist Government, 53 VAND. L. REV. 831 (2000); Greg Berman & John 
Feinblatt, Problem Solving Courts: A Brief Primer, 23 LAW & POL’Y 125 (2001); Deborah 
Epstein, Effective Intervention in Domestic Violence Cases, 11 YALE J. L. & FEMINISM 3 
(1999). 
 68. This includes multi-agency policy setting such as in transportation, urban sprawl, and 
sustainable growth.  
 69. Mediation is used in government agencies priority setting, corporate strategic 
planning, university mission statements, and budget planning. Even the American Association 
of Law Schools now sponsors facilitated planning retreats for law schools. Former Dean of 
Washington University School of Law, Dorsey “Dan” Ellis, and I are members of the AALS 
Resource Corps, trained to facilitate consensus-building law school planning retreats. Indeed, I 
facilitated such a retreat at Washington University several years ago with Curtis Berger, former 
professor at Columbia University Law School (now deceased). 
 70. International environmental treaties, state, local, and regional coordinating efforts on 
such issues as crime, growth, and AIDS policy utilize mediation. See LAWRENCE SUSSKIND, 
NEGOTIATING INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL TREATIES (2001); Michael Hughes et al., 
Facilitating Statewide HIV/AIDS Policies in Colorado, in THE CONSENSUS BUILDING 
HANDBOOK, supra note 18.  
 71. Non-decisional opportunities to debate, discuss, and inform communities that have 
widely different views about important political or moral issues such as abortion, see, e.g., 
Michelle LeBaron & Nike Cartarphen, Finding Common Ground on Abortion, in THE 
CONSENSUS BUILDING HANDBOOK, supra note 18; Margaret Herzig, Public Conversations, 4 
DISP. RESOL. MAG., Summer 1998, at 10; affirmative action, see discussion of facilitated 
dialogues on California’s Proposition 209 (anti-affirmative action referendum) in Menkel-
Meadow, supra note 13, at 34-35, animal rights, see, e.g., LAWRENCE SUSSKIND & J. 
CRUIKSHANK, BREAKING THE IMPASSE (1987), without any expectation of decision, but in 
hopes of furthering human understanding also use mediation. 
 72. Mediation has been used in South Africa’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission, the 
Human Values Project in Macedonia, and even bookstore/coffee house readings and 
discussions of controversial matters). See, e.g., MARTHA MINOW, BETWEEN VENGEANCE AND 
FORGIVENESS (1998); SUSAN COLLIN MARKS, WATCHING THE WIND: CONFLICT RESOLUTION 
DURING SOUTH AFRICA’S TRANSITION TO DEMOCRACY (2000). 
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procedures that differ from conventional litigation.73 First, all the 
stakeholders or interested parties are identified and invited to the 
process, either in direct participation or by constituent representation. 
Second, the parties identify a broad agenda, rather than a limited set 
of triable issues. Third, in complex cases, a professional team of 
convenors studies the conflict or dispute or policy agenda and creates 
a conflict assessment or map of the proceeding to be commented on 
in advance by all the parties. Fourth, the parties select neutral 
facilitators to guide both process and rules of decision. During the 
process, the parties engage in joint fact-finding while the facilitators 
and parties develop groundrules for structured, but open, discourse.74 
Further, parties engage in creative brainstorming, rather than 
argumentative debate or structured witness examination. Neutral 
process experts facilitate collaboration, and often task-specified team 
assignments work simultaneously and decisions are “taken” by party-
agreed standards of consensus in policy settings or consent in 
mediated agreements. The outcomes, reached by facilitated 
negotiation and consent, rather than externally imposed decisions, are 
widely thought to lead to greater satisfaction, legitimacy, 
implementability, and voluntary compliance. 
Conventional public interest advocacy often assumes that there 
are good guys and bad guys. For justice to prevail, a third party, the 
courts, must hear the facts and rule the bad guys out of order 
establishing good legal precedent in the process.75 Problems arise 
when there are many actors and good guys and bad guys meld 
together, when there are not enough resources to share between the 
bad guys and the good guys, or when the processes76 are simply 
 
 73. See generally MENKEL-MEADOW, MEDIATION, supra note 63. 
 74. Ground rules are particularized for each situation from a common core of principles. 
In mediation, confidentiality is likely to be one of the key ground rules. Confidentiality is 
complex, as evidenced by the many layers of rules and laws pertaining to mediation 
confidentiality. See, e.g., Symposium, Uniform Mediation Act, 85 MARQUETTE L. REV. 1 
(2001). In consensus building, openness or transparency is more likely to be the ground rule, 
especially in jurisdictions with Open Meeting or Sunshine laws. See ROGERS ET AL., 
MEDIATION, LAW, PRACTICE AND POLICY (2001). 
 75. Legislative advocacy seeks to create statutory law by using testimony, also usually 
quite adversarial or agonistic, to regulate the bad guys and protect the good guys. See DEBORAH 
TANNEN, THE ARGUMENT CULTURE (1998). 
 76. Traditional processes include courts, legislatures, and administrative agencies. 
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gridlocked with competing sides or overworked with too-big-to-
handle-dockets. When the losers in the electoral process or the 
defeated in the litigation process, seek to upset their losses with 
constant battles, new elections, appeals, and attempts to dethrone or 
reverse “settled” outcomes, the paradigm again fails. Occasionally, 
the interested parties are so turned off by the complexities, expense, 
and wastefulness of these traditional processes they simply refuse to 
participate. Because of these concerns, and others, creative lawyers,77 
attempting to find social justice for the many, rather than for the few, 
use the structured processes of mediation and consensus building to 
arrive at negotiated solutions to very complex legal and social 
problems. 
The environmental arena is an especially productive domain for 
these processes. Former Secretary of the Interior, Bruce Babbitt, 
frustrated by the legislative grid-lock on some forms of 
environmental regulation and wildlife protection, championed a 
process he denominated “quasi-legislative dispute resolution.”78 
Habitat Conservation Planning empowers the stakeholders in a 
particular region to engage in trades and negotiations and to set 
standards for preservation of species not protected by the binary 
approach of current legislation.79 Environmental problems over 
 
 77. Lawyers are joined by other professionals, including mediators, urban planners, 
diplomats, social workers, and psychologists in utilizing mediation. 
 78. Bruce Babbitt, ADR Concepts: Reshaping the Way Natural Resource Decisions Are 
Made, in INTO THE 21ST CENTURY: THOUGHT PIECES ON LAWYERING, PROBLEM SOLVING AND 
ADR 14 (CPR Institute for Dispute Resolution ed., 2001). 
 79. As an example, he recounted his experience on Cape Cod when the proliferation of 
seagulls, due to increased human presence, threatened several endangered bird species. The 
Interior Departments’ solution of lacing croutons with cyanide to kill the gulls brought more 
parties and issues to the dispute. The croutons made the gulls sick, but not sick enough–they 
didn’t die right away but circled into the streets of Cape towns like Chatham. The animal rights 
groups decried the killing of the gulls calling it “speciesim,” but the biologists were concerned 
about preserving some bird groups that faced extinction.  
 A consensus building-forum was quickly organized and a solution reached. “Hazers” were 
stationed to flash and wave flags at the gulls, with an occasional rocket being set off, to scare 
them away, rather than kill them. Even with this creative solution, eventually “deus ex 
machina” and time helped. A sudden increase in coyotes on the island (another product of 
increased human habitation) also scared the gulls and unfortunately ate the youngest gulls. But, 
the animal rights people couldn’t blame people, it was the “delicate balance of nature” and the 
“natural” laws of the animals that eventually solved the problem. 
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natural resource use80 cannot be solved in dichotomous terms and not 
with the time-consuming processes of litigation or legislation. “New 
governmental processes”81 involve all the stakeholders and to manage 
a variety of targeted, and in some cases, unique, creative solutions to 
problems. Such solutions may themselves be contingent and re-
visited with an agreed-upon process as scientific conditions or facts 
change. 
The state of Oregon convened such a process to manage its 
highway access dispute.82 The dispute involved commuters and 
developers who wanted more roads and residents and business people 
who wanted fewer, larger roads, which threaten more intimate 
communities and businesses running though existing towns and 
villages. The Policy Consensus Institute helped facilitate a process. 
All identified stakeholders participated, and a long-term plan was 
first recommended to, and then adopted by, the appropriate 
governmental decision-makers. The Governor of Oregon is so 
committed to the process that he sits on the Board of the Policy 
Consensus Institute.83 
The EPA, OSHA, and a variety of federal agencies are using a 
similar process. The agencies use negotiated rule-making84 to involve 
all stakeholders in rule drafting before the fact. Early involvement 
avoids conflicts after the notice and comment period.85 While the 
evaluative jury is still out on the success and efficiency of these 
proceedings,86 “reg-neg” is being used by federal, state, and local 
 
 80. These include water, forests, air, deserts, and competing animal groups and land itself. 
 81. Babbitt, supra note 78, at 13-15. 
 82. Videotape: Building Consensus: Transportation Rulemaking in Oregon (Policy 
Consensus Initiative 2000) (on file with author). 
 83. PCI Board of Directors Names New Chair, POLICY CONSENSUS INITIATIVE 
NEWSLETTER, Feb. 2002, at 7. 
 84. This is referred to as “reg-neg.” 
 85. Without “reg-neg” post notice and comment conflicts typically end in court with an 
often decade-long appeals processes. 
 86. Compare Cary Coglianese, Is Consensus an Appropriate Basis for Regulatory 
Policy?, in ENVIRONMENTAL CONTRACTS 93 (Eric Orts & Kurt Deketelaere eds., 2001), and 
Cary Coglianese, Assessing the Advocacy of Negotiated Rule-Making, 9 N.Y.U. ENV. L.J. 386 
(2001), with Philip Harter, Assessing the Assessors, 9 N.Y.U. ENV. L.J. 32 (2000), and JODY 
FREEMAN & LAURA LANGBEIN, REGULATORY NEGOTIATION AND THE LEGITIMACY BENEFIT 
(2002). See also Laura Langbein & Cornelius Kerwin, Negotiation versus Conventional 
Rulemaking, 10 J. PUB. ADMIN. RES. & THEORY 599 (2000). 
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governments.87 
Beyond formal governmental uses, consensus building techniques 
facilitate hotly contested value disputes. I facilitated “public 
conversations” on affirmative action in California when Proposition 
209 was pending. The aim was to educate voters that the issue was 
far more complex than the polarized election debate suggested. 
Different parties argued for different levels of affirmative action in 
education, employment, and government contracting. The main goal 
of the public conversations was to inform the public by exposing 
multiple views from different sources, rather than the stylized debate 
presented by the media88 and election materials. Public conversations, 
facilitated by neutral professionals, have also been effective in the 
bitterly contested realm of pro-choice and pro-life communities. The 
conversations work to enhance understanding across seemingly 
unbridgeable divides, as well as to encourage agreement on some 
life-preserving solutions.89 
At the level of formal litigation, mediative settlement processes 
and consensus building fora facilitate resolutions to a variety of mass 
torts90 and class actions.91 This includes both the process dimensions 
of “streams” of cases using ADR methods92 (like mediation and 
arbitration to decide individual claims93) and more creative outcomes 
than courts normally would be permitted.94 Increasingly, federal95 and 
 
 87. Mayor Anthony Williams, for example, has initiated a series of community fora, 
facilitated by consensus building neutrals, on a number of specific issues in Washington D.C. 
See DC Agenda, available at http://www.dcagenda.org (last visited Aug. 27, 2002) (an 
organization—non-profit—created to sponsor and coordinate such multi-party collaborations in 
Washington D.C.). 
 88. Even the so-called “enlightened” PBS Newshour continues to use pro/con formats for 
most important issues. 
 89. Opponents may agree to diminish abortion clinic violence and pro-adoption material 
distribution at clinics. See supra note 70. 
 90. In re Dow Corning Corp., 187 B.R. 934 (E.D. Mich. Sept. 12, 1995); In re Joint 
Eastern and Southern Dist. Asbestos Litig., 122 B.R. 6 (E.D. N.Y. Dec. 7, 1990). 
 91. In re Airline Ticket Comm’n Antitrust Litig., 268 F.3d 619 (8th Cir. 2001). 
 92. In re A.H. Robins Co., Inc., 880 F.2d 709 (4th Cir. 1989). 
 93. Pigford v. Glickman, 185 F.R.D. 82 ( D.D.C. 1999). 
 94. Coupons, in-kind items, and other “non-monetary” outcomes are not without their 
own controversies. Some believe class members receive very little relief, especially compared 
to the large attorney fees awards that go to the plaintiffs’ lawyers in these cases. See, e.g., Susan 
Koniak, Under Cloak of Settlement, 82 VA. L. REV. 1051 (1996). 
 95. ROBERT J. NIEMIC ET AL., GUIDE TO JUDICIAL MANAGEMENT OF CASES IN ADR 
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state courts are requiring parties to participate in various forms of 
ADR as part of the formal litigation process. All of the federal circuit 
courts of appeal have mediation programs.96 Some judges use 
mediation in early stages of litigation or in very long and contested 
cases with complex remedial issues.97 At the federal level, recent 
Attorney General Janet Reno became a champion of ADR and other 
forms of “legal problem solving.” She established the Inter-agency 
Alternative Dispute Resolution Working Group to coordinate the use 
of ADR in many federal agencies on issues such as contract 
procurement and disputes, employment, administrative costs, 
environmental clean-up, and inter-agency jurisdictional disputes.98 
Mediation also reverts to its source: the “simple” two party 
dispute about almost anything. In the public interest environment, a 
very few argue that creative and “gentler” forms of dispute resolution 
can actually provide greater access to more individualized justice in a 
variety of case types that greatly affect the disempowered.99 Clearly, 
there are issues of equality, access, and economic support for 
participation in these different forms of justice.100 To the extent that 
creative and participatory aspects of new forms of dispute resolution 
are available to those who can pay for them, they should also be 
available for those who cannot pay for them.101  
 
(2001). 
 96. ROBERT J. NIEMIC, MEDIATION AND CONFERENCE PROGRAMS IN THE FEDERAL 
COURTS OF APPEAL (1997); see also ROBERT J, NIEMEC, MEDIATION IN BANKRUPTCY (1998). 
 97. See Tennessee higher ed. case, Cleveland, and Ohio (appointment of Howard Bellman 
for state-wide mediation,) etc. 
 98. Daniel Marcus & Jeffrey Senger, ADR and the Federal Government, 66 MO. L. REV. 
709 (2001). 
 99. Common issues include family law, housing issues, entitlement disputes, consumer 
disputes, wage and employment disputes, and a host of other problems that involve poor people 
and the state and disputes among the disempowered. See, e.g., Russell Engler, And Justice for 
All –Including the Unrepresented Poor, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 1987 (1999); Linda Singer et al., 
Alternative Dispute Resolution and the Poor, Part 1: What ADR Processes Exist and Why 
Advocates Should Become Involved, 26 CLEARINGHOUSE R. 142 (1992); Linda Singer et al., 
Alternative Dispute Resolution and the Poor, Part II: Dealing with Problems in Using ADR and 
Choosing a Process, 26 CLEARINGHOUSE R. 288 (1992). 
 100. Proponents of social justice must be sensitive to the “siphoning off” of “smaller” 
claims to secondary institutions. Richard Abel, The Contradictions of Informal Justice, in THE 
POLITICS OF INFORMAL JUSTICE (Richard Abel ed., 1982); Richard Delgado et al., Fairness and 
Formality, 1985 WISC. L. REV. 1359; Trina Grillo, Mediation: Process Dangers for Women, 
100 YALE L.J. 1545 (1991). 
 101. Tailored solutions, in some circumstance, bring better and faster “relief” and should 
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There are many other examples of concrete successes with 
mediation and consensus building processes to achieve creative 
outcomes to complex legal and policy problems with greater party 
participation. 
Access and resources are as important in mediation and consensus 
building processes as in the formal justice system. Participation 
requires time, as well as financial resources that many people do not 
have. Both Iris Young102 and Oscar Wilde have eloquently stated this 
critique: “The trouble with socialism is that it takes too many 
evenings.”103 Some suggest that consensus, consent, and quality 
results might be harder to achieve in group settings where positions, 
interests, and arguments might either become polarized104 or 
“regress” to a compromised mean or to an inadequately tested 
“groupthink”105 (or “path dependent”) solution.106 Others suggest that 
there is a certain irony in suggesting that specialized experts, like 
mediators or consensus building facilitators, are needed to enhance 
democratic participation in decision-making and problem-solving. 
Why should democracy depend on experts and especially, legal 
experts?107 These objections obviate the need for lawyers, particularly 
public interest minded lawyers, to learn new and different skills from 
the standard diet of case-based adversary argument and analysis.  
VI. IMPLICATIONS FOR LEGAL EDUCATION: TRAINING THE MODERN 
PUBLIC INTEREST LAWYER 
If there are other ways to deal with multi-party and multi-faceted 
legal and policy dilemmas, through the use of facilitated negotiated 
 
be available regardless of ability to pay. 
 102. Iris Marion Young, Activist Challenges to Deliberative Democracy, 29 POL. THEORY 
670 (2001). 
 103. BARRY DAY, OSCAR WILDE: A LIFE IN QUOTES 238 (2000). The same can be said of 
participatory democracy. 
 104. Cass Sunstein, Deliberative Trouble? Why Groups Go To Extremes, 110 YALE L.J. 71 
(2000). 
 105. IRVING L. JANIS, GROUPTHINK: PSYCHOLOGICAL STUDIES OF POLICY DECISIONS AND 
FIASCOS (2d ed. 1982). “Groupthink” is also referred to as a “path dependent” solution. 
 106. Perhaps groups will seek the “lowest common denominator” rather than the pareto 
optimal solution. 
 107. No process is perfect and I think these objections, and others, are well made and 
deserve more consideration than I give them here. 
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processes such as mediation and consensus building, then the modern 
law student and lawyer will need to learn a variety of other skills and 
“intelligences”108 to engage in this work. First, traditional legal 
analysis has to be supplemented with substantive and synthetic forms 
of creative thinking.109 Lawyers must learn to solve problems by 
looking beyond the precedents and boilerplates of prior cases and 
prior deals. The early days of the public interest movement are 
replete with examples of lawyers developing new causes of action 
and new legal theories.110 Here, I am suggesting that some creativity 
with respect to process may be as important as substantive legal ideas 
and will require learning how to think outside of conventional legal 
boxes. Argument, trials, and legal research are all still important 
aspects of a legal education. Nevertheless, a more modern legal 
education should include instruction on the sociology and psychology 
of group behavior.111 This will enable students to understand how 
decisions are made, to understand meeting management and 
facilitation,112 to be able to wisely conduct the meetings that produce 
legal solutions to problems, and the constituent skills of negotiation113 
and mediation.114 Beyond learning the role of the neutral, now 
 
 108. See the work of Howard Gardner in specifying a variety of human intelligences in 
which logico-linguistic intelligences (the most common form of intelligences for lawyers) are 
only some of the intelligences humans possess to solve problem. HOWARD GARDNER, FRAMES 
OF MIND: THE THEORY OF MULTIPLE INTELLIGENCES (1983). 
 109. See Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Aha? Is Creativity Possible in Legal Problem Solving 
and Teachable in Legal Education, 6 HARV. NEG. J. 97 (2001). 
 110. See Joseph Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Resources Law: Effective 
Judicial Intervention, 68 MICH. L. REV. 471 (1970) (land as public trusts); CATHERINE A. 
MACKINNON, ONLY WORDS (1993); CATHERINE A. MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED 
(1987) (pornography as a civil wrong); Charles Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733 
(1964) (government entitlements as property); Symposium, The Legacy of Goldberg v. Kelly: A 
Twenty Year Perspective, 5 BROOK. L. REV. 731 (1990) (procedural due process revolution). 
 111. Donald Langevoort, Behavioral Theories of Judgment and Decision Making in Legal 
Scholarship, 51 VAND. L. REV. 1499 (1998); Russell Korobkin & Thomas S. Ulen, Law and 
Behavioral Science, 88 CAL. L. REV. 1051 (2000); Russell Korobkin & Chris Guthrie, 
Psychology, Economics and Settlement, 76 TEX. L. REV. 77 (1997). 
 112. See, e.g., ROGER SCHWARTZ, THE SKILLED FACILITATOR (1994); TIM HINDLE, 
MANAGING MEETINGS (1998). 
 113. These skills include client interviewing and counseling, questioning, information 
development and fact-finding, brainstorming, as well as argumentation.  
 
 114. Mediation requires a kind of “neutrality” quite inimical to most conceptions of the 
lawyer. The American Bar Association has recognized this important function of lawyers, in its 
recently approved new version of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct. See Report of the 
Commission on Professional Responsibility, Ethics 2000 (Feb. 5, 2002) (approved by the 
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common in law school courses in mediation, the modern lawyer 
needs to learn how to be “inside” these new processes, if not as a 
traditional advocate then as a representative of creative ideas, as well 
as client interests.115  
In addition, law students and lawyers need to explicitly learn how 
to represent organizational and constituency interests,116 as business 
students learn explicitly about entity and organizational interests and 
conflicts in decision-making. Recognizing that modern legal 
problems do not often divide into sides, modern lawyers need to learn 
about coalitional117 behavior and multi-party processes118 and how 
they differ in both theory and practice from dyadic processes. Finally, 
if we take multi-culturalism seriously, both domestically and 
internationally, we must avoid legal ethnocentrism that is already 
threatening some international ADR processes,119 as well as public 
interest work in other nations.120 Issues of managing inter-cultural 
and multi-jurisdictional disputes, transactions, treaties, and policy 
 
A.B.A. House of Delegates). The Preamble and Rules 1.12 and 2.4 now recognize the role of 
the lawyer as “third party neutral” as a “non-representational role helping parties to resolve a 
dispute or plan a transactional matter.” See also Howard Gadlin & Elizabeth Pino, Neutrality: A 
Guide for the Organizational Ombudsperson, 13 NEG. J. 17 (1997). 
 115. A growing body of literature addresses this need for different teaching topics and 
modalities. See, e.g., Suzanne J. Schmitz, What Should We Teach in ADR Courses?, 6 HARV. 
NEG. J. 189 (2001); Jean Sternlight, Lawyers’ Representation of Clients in Mediation, 14 OHIO 
ST. J. DISP. RESOL. 269 (1999). 
 116. These include managing a group client process, which is different from individual 
clients. 
 117. For some important treatments of these topics for legal audiences, see Gary 
Goodpaster, Coalitions and Representative Bargaining, 9 OHIO ST. J. DISP. RES. 243 (1994); 
ROBERT MNOOKIN ET AL., BEYOND WINNING (2000). See also HOWARD RAIFFA, LECTURES ON 
NEGOTIATION ANALYSIS (1996); Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Negotiating with Lawyers, Men and 
Things, 17 NEG. J. 257 (2001). 
 118. A few scholars in the ADR field have begun teaching ‘advanced” negotiation courses 
in multi-party dispute resolution—Melanie Greenberg and I at Georgetown, Robert Mnookin 
and Lawrence Susskind at Harvard, and Maude Prevere at Stanford—which draw on these 
subjects and others. 
 119. Many critics charge, for example, that international commercial arbitration is 
becoming ever more “americanized” as American forms of discovery and litigation tactics 
begin to swamp older European forms of practice and civil law understandings of the lex 
mercatoria. See, e.g., YVES DEZALAY & BRYANT GARTH, DEALING IN VIRTUE: 
INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF A TRANSNATIONAL 
LEGAL ORDER (1996). 
 120. See, e.g., Stephen Ellmann, Cause Lawyering in the Third World, in CAUSE 
LAWYERING (Austin Sarat & Stuart Scheingold eds., 1998); CAUSE LAWYERING AND THE 
STATE IN A GLOBAL ERA (2001). 
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agendas will require development of rigorous and sensitive ways to 
explore legal problem solving beyond the assumptions of American 
constitutionalism, lawmaking, and litigation processes.  
In the wake of September 11, I have been doing my most 
challenging, difficult, and exciting teaching and practice. How can 
we attempt to forge justice and peace in a world in which there are 
many conflicting world views?121 Since I have come to believe, with 
the painfulness of our recent tragedies and the domestic aftermaths, 
that agreement as to the substantive good is unlikely, we should turn 
a lot of our attention to the possibility of designing some processes 
that will work to cross those divides. If “the skillful management of 
conflicts is among the highest of human skills,”122 as Stuart 
Hampshire suggests it is, it is in the public interest to pursue more 
varied methods for resolving conflicts and seeking justice. It is clear 
that war and its legal equivalent of litigation are necessary in some 
circumstances. Hopefully, our legal institutions, like all human 
institutions, will evolve and change to meet the changing demands of 
an ever-diversifying world of different values, save perhaps one: a 
human universal to survive and flourish.  
 
 121. For a domestic exploration of the difficulty of negotiating across radically different 
world views, see JOYCE DOHERTY, LESSONS FROM WACO (2001). For another depressing 
international perspective, see MICHAEL IGNATIEFF, BLOOD AND BELONGING (1993). 
 122. HAMPSHIRE, supra note 1. 
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